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Abstract This paper proposes a growth oriented dual income tax by combining an
allowance for corporate equity with a broadly defined flat tax on personal capital in-
come. Revenue losses are compensated by an increase in the value added tax. The paper
demonstrates the neutrality properties of the reform with respect to investment, firm
financial decisions and organizational choice. Tax rates are chosen to prevent income
shifting from labor to capital income. The reform decisively strengthens investment
of domestically owned firms as well as home and foreign based multinationals and
boosts savings. Simulations with a calibrated growth model for Switzerland indicate
that the reform could add between 4 to 5 percent of GNP in the long-run, depending
on the specific scenario. Given the slow nature of capital accumulation, it imposes
considerable costs in the short-run. We consider a tax smoothing scenario to offset the
intergenerationally redistributive effects.
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1 Introduction
The high international mobility of portfolio capital and multinational investments has
rendered the taxation of capital income increasingly difficult. Personal taxes on interest
and dividend income not only reduce the volume of savings but also drive out portfolio
C. Keuschnigg () . M. D. Dietz
University of St. Gallen (IFF-HSG), CEPR and CESifo, Varnbu¨elstrasse 19,
CH 9000 St. Gallen, Switzerland
e-mail: christian.keuschnigg@unisg.ch
M. D. Dietz
e-mail: martin.dietz@unisg.ch
Springer
192 C. Keuschnigg, M.D. Dietz
capital to other countries. High corporate taxes suppress investments by domestically
owned firms and deter international direct investments.1 Multinational firms might
also shift profits towards subsidiaries in low tax countries by manipulating transfer
prices and engaging in other activities of international tax arbitrage (see Gordon and
Hines (2002)).
The taxation of capital income not only discourages the level of savings and invest-
ment, but also the allocation of capital towards different types of investments and of
savings towards different types of assets. Reflecting imperfect integration of corporate
and personal income taxes and given special tax preferences, taxation of income from
interest bearing assets, dividends and capital gains is far from uniform. Further devi-
ations from comprehensive income taxation are found in the tax treatment of owner
occupied housing and of savings for old age insurance. Income on portfolio capital
invested abroad may escape domestic residence based personal taxes to a considerable
extent. In consequence, the distortions in household portfolio composition might be
as severe as the tax distortion of the level of savings, as Bernheim (2002) and Poterba
(2002) argue.
Apart from its effect on the level of domestic and foreign direct investment, the sys-
tem of company taxation interferes with an efficient allocation of capital by distorting
the choice of organizational form (MacKie-Mason and Gordon, 1997), influencing
the debt-equity choice (Miller, 1977), favoring profit retentions and reducing payouts
(Poterba, 2004), and discouraging new firm creation (see Cullen and Gordon (2002)).
To sum up, a more neutral system of capital income taxation may yield efficiency
gains by eliminating distortions both in the level and allocation of capital.
A number of countries have switched to taxing parts of personal capital income
with a separate low and flat rate and have partly moved towards a form of dual income
tax.2 From an equity perspective, personal capital income taxation leads to a higher
tax on future relative to present consumption and thereby discriminates against savers.
Under this view, the distributional objective is already achieved with a progressive
labor income tax plus a progressive tax on inheritances and wealth transfers which
give rise to exogenously received asset wealth. A moderate capital income tax could
be justified if the collection of these taxes is incomplete for other reasons. Erosa and
Gervais (2002) argue that a modest tax on capital income also shifts the tax burden
from the young towards the old and fosters taxation according to the individual ability
to pay. A dual income tax is thus a compromise that helps to limit the double taxation
of capital income on account of simultaneous wealth, capital income and inflation
taxation in a non-indexed tax system. A flat rate on comprehensively defined capital
income also fosters horizontal equity in the taxation of different types of capital income.
On grounds of economic efficiency, capital income should be taxed less heavily if the
tax base is more sensitive than in the case of labor income. To withstand the pressures
from international tax competition, an open economy should reduce company taxes
1 Some highly selective references to the empirical literature are Hines (1999), Devereux and Griffith (1998)
and de Mooij and Ederveen (2003) on international investment, and Hassett and Hubbard (2002), Auerbach
and Hassett (2003), on domestic investment.
2 The concept of the Nordic dual income tax was suggested by Sørensen (1994) and further developed by
Nielsen and Sørensen (1997) and Sørensen (1998). Gordon (2000) and Boadway (2004) review the general
issues related to differential taxation of capital and labor income.
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to attract mobile firms and reduce personal taxes to prevent the flight of portfolio
capital. A flat tax on comprehensively defined personal capital income limits costly
tax arbitrage activities and thereby reduces the distortions in the allocation of savings
and investments across different types of assets.
In this paper, we propose a novel variant of a growth oriented dual income tax.
It combines an allowance for corporate equity (ACE) with a dual income tax of the
Nordic type and is called ADIT for short. We demonstrate the neutrality properties
of the system with respect to investment, firm financial decisions and organizational
choice. The reform strengthens savings and domestic investment of home and foreign
based multinationals. Simulations with a calibrated growth model for Switzerland
indicate that the reform could add between 4 to 5 percent of GNP in the long-run.
Given the slow nature of capital accumulation, it also imposes considerable costs in the
short-run. The revenue shortfalls and the need to finance them with other distortionary
taxes materialize much faster than the long-run benefits from induced growth. To offset
the intergenerationally redistributive effects, we compute a tax smoothing scenario
using government debt to distribute the tax burden evenly among present and future
generations.
Our model features a rare degree of detail to allow a more informative quantita-
tive evaluation than is available in other studies. We distinguish domestically owned
corporate and non-corporate firms, as well as domestic subsidiaries of home and
foreign based multinational firms. Such disaggregation is essential since tax reform
often affects different types of firms quite differentially or is relevant only for part
of the business sector rather than the total economy as is regularly assumed in more
aggregate studies. Further, our model endogenizes debt equity choice and dividend
payout behavior of corporations which are prime margins affected by most business
tax reforms. We are able to compile effective marginal tax rates (EMTR) in the same
detail as e.g. the European Commission (2001). In addition, we quantify the general
equilibrium impact when a reform changes these effective rates. Finally, household
decisions derive from an overlapping generations model with endogenous labor supply
and an endogenous determination of the level and portfolio composition of savings.
A detailed model of household behavior is necessary to estimate the reform’s impact
on work and savings incentives as well as international portfolio allocation.
We believe that the present exercise in business tax reform is of interest much beyond
the Swiss case. The reform scenario connects to the US debate on the dividend tax
relief of the Bush administration, see Carroll, Hassett and Mackie (2003) and Gravelle
(2003), and to the Growth and Investment Tax Plan of the President’s Advisory Panel
on Federal Tax Reform (2005). The latter plan combines a cash-flow tax on corporate
income with a dual income tax on the personal level. Our numerical analysis introduces
the components of ADIT step by step. Since the first parts coincide with the panel’s
proposal, our results might be of interest to the US audience as well.3 The paper
should as well be informative about the potential impact of a dual income tax reform
as implemented in the Nordic countries and proposed for other European countries, see
Cnossen (1999); Sachversta¨ndigenrat (2003) or Sinn (2003). A thorough quantitative
3 The proposal is supported by a static analysis of the reform. Occasionally, the results of a basic dynamic
analysis are reported.
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evaluation of these proposals is not yet available, at least at the level of detail offered
by our quantitative model.
The paper presents in Section 2 the main tax reform proposal and demonstrates
important neutrality properties. Section 3 provides a numerical evaluation for the
Swiss case. We evaluate the long-run impact as well as the short-run and transitional
effects and check for sensitivity. Section 4 concludes.
2 A growth oriented dual income tax
2.1 The ADIT system
The ADIT proposal combines the Nordic type of dual income taxation with an al-
lowance for corporate equity (ACE). The proposal is described and analyzed in much
detail in Keuschnigg (2004a) and rests on five pillars:
1. Progressive wage taxation with a top rate of t L .
2. Proportional profit taxation at a flat tax rate tU . The tax applies uniformly to all
firms, corporate and non-corporate.
3. Deduction from the profit tax tU of a normal rate of return on equity, equal to a
long-run average of the risk free return on government bonds.
4. A proportional “shareholder” tax t S at the personal level on all types of capi-
tal income (interest, dividends, and realized capital gains). A surcharge on real-
ized capital gains is charged to offset the interest gains due to tax deferral lead-
ing to an accruals equivalent rate equal to t S . The rate satisfies the restriction
(
1 − tU ) (1 − t S) = 1 − t L to avoid tax arbitrage by misdeclaration of owners’
wages. The shareholder tax allows full loss offset. Losses may be carried forward
over unlimited periods and carried backwards over a limited time span.
5. Adjustment of the value added tax to balance the government budget.
2.1.1 Allowance for corporate equity (ACE)
The allowance for corporate equity is the single most important measure to stimulate
investment and growth. The basic idea is to extend the tax deductibility of interest on
business debt to a normal return on equity as well, see Boadway and Bruce (1984) and
the Institute for Fiscal Studies (1991). Bond and Devereux (2003) find that no more
than a risk free normal return equal to the net of tax return on government debt is
called for, provided that full loss offset is guaranteed which also requires an indefinite
carry-forward of losses with interest. Given tax deduction of all costs of finance, the
ACE system makes the profit tax neutral with respect to investment and avoids the tax
distortion in favor of debt finance. The profit tax continues to tax in a non-distortive
way a supernormal return on capital. The reduction in the average tax rate on profits
is the mirror image of the revenue losses incurred by the government.
The recent literature on international taxation, see Gordon (1986) and Razin and
Sadka (1991), implies that a country should optimally set its source taxes to zero if
it can use other taxes to finance a given expenditure. Haufler and Schjelderup (2000)
show that this can be achieved by using a cash-flow tax which sets the EMTR at the
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firm level to zero but retains a positive statutory tax rate that allows to tax economic
rents. The ACE allowance is an alternative way to set the EMTR to zero. The role of
the statutory tax rate is to tax rents and supernormal profits. According to Huizinga
and Nielsen (1997), a positive rate also taxes domestically generated rents that accrue
to foreigners under foreign ownership of domestically operating firms and thereby
helps to shift income from foreigners to domestic citizens. Under the ADIT system, a
positive tax rate is also needed to prevent income shifting from labor to capital income.
The ACE allowance sets the EATR on investments with a normal return to zero
and much reduces it for projects with a supernormal return. Since the discrete location
decisions of multinational firms are dominated by the average tax burden, see Devereux
and Griffith (1998), the ACE system should attract inward foreign direct investment
(FDI) and reduce outward FDI by domestic multinationals. It is sometimes objected
that the ACE allowance discriminates against the most profitable investments, often
implemented by technologically advanced multinationals. However, the reduction of
the EATR is also a major benefit to these firms relative to the status quo. A country’s
ability in using tax incentives to target the most profitable, internationally mobile firms
is rather limited. As Keen (2001) and Devereux, Griffith and Klemm (2002) argue,
special tax regimes are probably the only possibility. If this is not possible, the only
way to attract them is to keep the EATR and, thus, the statutory rate low.
2.1.2 Dual income taxation
ADIT combines progressive wage taxation with a shareholder tax which is a flat
and modest, but comprehensive tax on capital income. Apart from being administra-
tively simple and avoiding a lot of problems in corporate personal tax integration, the
shareholder tax is central to the ADIT proposal for other reasons. First, its rate t S is
chosen to satisfy the restriction
(
1 − tU ) (1 − t S) = 1 − t L . This eliminates the in-
centives for tax arbitrage by misdeclaration of owners’ wages as capital income which
usually necessitates complicated and administratively expensive schemes.4 Consider
an entrepreneur in the top tax bracket: Reporting additional income as wage, she
pays the top wage tax at a rate t L , leaving her with net earnings 1 − t L . Alterna-
tively, her contribution to the firm’s earnings inflates profits and shows up as a su-
pernormal return. Since it results from the entrepreneur’s personal effort it will not
qualify for an ACE deduction. Consequently, earnings from the entrepreneur’s labor
input get double taxed, first at the company level at a rate tU and at the personal
level at a rate t S . By definition, the cumulative tax burden is the same as the wage
tax.5
Second, ADIT substantially reduces the double taxation of savings inherent in the
current income tax. The optimal tax literature suggests that the relative size of labor and
capital income tax rates should reflect the tax sensitivity of savings and labor income
(see Huizinga (1995) for a simple statement). Since a large part of labor supply is rather
inelastic, this argument calls for a lower personal tax rate on capital income. Third,
4 Sørensen (2005) calls this the Achilles heel of the Nordic dual income tax, see also Fjærli and Lund (2001)
and Lindhe, So¨dersten and ¨Oberg (2004).
5 If the entrepreneur’s personal tax rate is smaller, she can always obtain the firm’s income in terms of a
wage and thereby avoid a too high tax burden on profits.
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given unchanged taxation abroad, the low rate on personal capital income reduces
the incentives for outward portfolio investments and helps to contain capital flight.
At least part of these foreign portfolio investments will escape domestic taxation of
foreign source income under the residence principle.
Fourth, the uniform flat tax rate approximately ensures tax neutrality at the personal
level with respect to financing decisions. A surcharge corrects for the compound
interest gains as a result of tax deferral under the realization principle and leads to
an accruals equivalent capital gains tax rate equal to the dividend tax rate. The tax
rate on realized gains increases with the length of the holding period to offset the
benefit from deferral. To keep the tax administratively simple, it is assumed that
capital gains are evenly distributed over the holding period.6 The proposed calculation
of capital gains roughly, although not exactly, assures holding period neutrality and
allows for a more efficient risk diversification of portfolio investors. The equal effective
tax rates on dividends and capital gains equate the costs of capital from retained
earnings and new equity. The tax thus encourages firms to pay out profits and to
raise new equity on the capital market. This should improve the market’s efficiency
in allocating scarce capital towards the most productive investments. Furthermore,
ADIT also ensures tax neutrality at the personal level with respect to firms’ debt
equity choice. Since all types of firms are treated uniformly, the ADIT system is also
neutral with respect to the choice of organizational form. Finally, ADIT ensures full
loss offset and thereby encourages risk taking on account of the Domar Musgrave
effect. According to Cullen and Gordon (2002) and Sørensen (2005), this insurance
effect of a proportional tax with full loss offset should favor small domestic firms where
entrepreneurs are exposed to substantial undiversified risk, and thus should reduce the
risk premium and encourage growth. Although not accounted for in our quantitative
model, this advantage must not be neglected for an overall evaluation of the reform
proposal.
2.1.3 Value added tax
The ADIT proposal will lose tax revenue. It exempts a normal return on equity
from the profit tax and roughly halves the current tax rates on interest and divi-
dend income. The more effective capital gains taxation will not generate much rev-
enue since the tax base is very narrow. We consider two alternative scenarios to
finance the revenue losses. One is to raise the value added tax to balance the rev-
enue losses. Shifting the tax burden towards labor and eroding the real wage, the
economic costs will show up in an added labor supply distortion. Alternatively, we
cut lump-sum transfers to see how much the efficiency gains from the increased neu-
trality of capital income taxation are offset by the extra labor market distortion. In the
Swiss context, the two scenarios are motivated by the value added tax rate of 7.6%
which is very low by European standards. Further, the size of the government sector
and, in particular, social transfers had growth rates among the highest of all OECD
countries.
6 The assumption should hold on average but will clearly not be satisfied in each individual case. The
scheme proposed in Auerbach (1991) achieves holding period neutrality in all cases, not only on average.
It would be administratively more difficult, however.
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2.1.4 Relation to other tax reform concepts
The ADIT system shares some interesting similarities with the Growth and Investment
Tax Plan proposed for the U.S. by the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax
Reform (2005). The panel proposed to combine a progressive tax on labor income,
with rates ranging from 15 to 30%, and a flat tax rate of 15% on interest, dividends,
and capital gains with a single-rate tax of 30% on business cash flow. The cash flow tax
allows immediate expensing of new investment but firms would not receive deductions
for interest paid on business debt. In the Swiss context, the ADIT system would also
feature a progressive wage tax schedule with a top rate of 37%, see Section 3.2 below,
and a flat tax rate on personal capital income of about 18%. The key difference to the
U.S. Tax Panel’s proposal is with the business tax where the ADIT system proposes,
instead of a cash-flow tax, an allowance for the cost of equity together with interest
deductions to achieve investment neutrality at the firm level. Since the cash-flow tax
extends the tax preference only to new investments, it should raise more revenue than
a business tax with an ACE allowance but still attain the desired investment neutrality.
It was felt, however, that the need to continue interest deductions on old debt and
disallowing deductions for new debt would create formidable transitional problems.
More importantly, a small country faces the risk that the cash-flow tax might not
be eligible for foreign tax credits in the United States, or other foreign countries,
see McLure and Zodrow (1998) for an extensive discussion. This would create a
formidable disincentive for incoming FDI in Switzerland. The case for a cash-flow tax
would presumably become much stronger if the U.S. itself would follow the Panel’s
proposal. Introducing a cash-flow tax, however, would require an alternative solution to
the income shifting problem of a dual income tax, possibly along the lines of Sørensen
(2005).
2.2 Analytical arguments
We start with a stylized analytical model to highlight the main transmission channels
and to build intuition for the most important impact from introducing ADIT. The next
section presents quantitative results from a much more detailed numerical model.
2.2.1 The investor’s perspective
Assume debt yields interest i before taxes and i n = (1 − t B)i after interest taxation
at rate t B . When assets are perfect substitutes, arbitrage behavior equates net of tax
returns of debt and equity:
i n V = (1 − t D)D + (1 − tG)[ ·V − V N ], i n = (1 − t B)i. (1)
An equity investment V yields dividends D subject to dividend taxation at rate t D ,
and capital gains ·V − V N net of capital gains taxes at an effective rate of tG . Capital
gains of current shareholders are changes in firm value ·V less new share issues V N .
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2.2.2 Corporate firms
The cash flow identity (2) equates the inflows (profits π , new equity V N , and new debt
N = ·B) to the outflows (dividends and investment I = ·K ). For simplicity, we ignore
depreciation of capital. Adhering to the old view of dividend taxation, dividends in
(3) are chosen as a fixed fraction θ of the total return.7
D + I = π + V N + N , (2)
D = θ · (D + ·V − V N ). (3)
Using (3), one can integrate the no arbitrage condition (1) subject to a transversality
constraint. Firm value equals the present value of future net dividends D − V N , see
(4). The net dividend flow is discounted using the cost of equity which is the required
gross return r prior to the personal tax t E on equity income. The cost of equity r
is endogenously determined to assure that equity and debt yield identical net of tax
returns, (1 − t E )r = (1 − t B)i . The personal tax on equity is an average of the dividend
and effective capital gains tax rates. The dividend payout ratio θ serves as a weight.8
Vt =
∫ ∞
t
(Ds − V Ns) exp (−r · (s − t)) ds, (4)
r = 1 − t
B
1 − t E i, t
E = θ t D + (1 − θ ) tG . (5)
The capacity to pay dividends depends on profits net of the profit tax at rate τ ,
π = f (K ) − (i + m)B − τ [ f (K ) − (i + m)B − μ · (K − B)], (6)
where f (K ) ≡ maxL F(K , L) − wL denotes maximized revenues net of wages. Prof-
its are further reduced by the interest cost on outstanding debt B, consisting of an
‘agency cost of debt’ m and interest payments to investors at rate i , and by the profits
tax. Interest payments are tax deductible. The tax base would be further reduced if
firms were allowed to deduct an imputed cost of equity at rate μ on the value of equity.
7 The simulation model includes an equity premium that declines with a higher payout ratio θ as in Poterba
and Summers (1985). Dietz and Keuschnigg (2004) analyze formally how payout policy responds to taxation.
This paper focuses on the debt-equity choice, instead.
8 See Eqs. (2.5) and (2.11) in Auerbach (2002). The simulation model assumes that total dividends D =
¯D + DR decompose into an exogenous distribution ¯D plus a variable dividend DR that is linked to total
returns as in (3) by an endogenously determined payout ratio θ . The constant part ¯D implies that total
dividends are rather stable, reflecting the empirical result ever since Lintner (1956) that firms adjust dividends
slowly to new information. Maybe more importantly, the basic dividend reduces the variable part DR which
lowers the value of the “marginal” payout ratio θ needed to match the model with aggregate dividend
payments. This reduces the weight of the dividend tax in the cost of equity and allows us to control for the
importance of the new view versus the old view in our simulation analysis.
Springer
Growth oriented dual income tax 199
Excessive debt leverage comes at a cost. Available collateral of firms is stretched
over a growing amount of debt making it more and more risky. The additional costs of
high debt usage might come as bankruptcy costs (Bond and Meghir, 1994 or Auerbach,
2002) or moral hazard leading to risky strategies (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers,
1977). When debt investors anticipate these problems, they request a premium m that
increases with the debt asset ratio b = B/K such that their return i net of bankruptcy
costs remains constant. On the other side, a limited debt load might be beneficial
to corporate governance since the fixed repayment tends to discipline managers, see
Jensen (1986). To sum up, firms pay interest i + m while investors only receive i . We
assume that the agency costs of debt financing depend on the debt ratio, are globally
convex and minimized for some natural debt ratio b∗. Formally,
m(b∗) = 0, m ′(b∗) = 0, m ′′ (b) > 0, b ≡ B/K . (7)
Investment and financial policies follow from value maximization subject to (2),
(6) and (7). The Hamiltonian is H = (1 − τ )[ f (K ) − (i + m) B] + τμ (K − B) −
I + N + q I + λN . Given shadow prices of capital and debt, q and λ, the optimality
conditions for investment I and new debt N are q = 1 and λ = −1. In the absence of
adjustment costs relating to changes in capital or debt, the shadow prices immediately
jump to their steady state values, implying ·q = ·λ = 0. The conditions for optimal
levels of capital and debt are
K : r = (1 − τ ) [ f ′ (K ) + b2m ′] + τμ, (8)
B : r = (1 − τ ) [m + bm ′] + τμ + (1 − τ ) i. (9)
For easier interpretation, we rewrite (9) and define a ‘tax preference for debt’ ∇:
∇ ≡ r − τμ − (1 − τ ) i
1 − τ = m + bm
′. (10)
If debt and equity are treated equally on the personal level, the pretax returns are
identical, r = i , see (5). Interest deductibility at the company level, however, creates a
positive preference for debt equal to ∇ = τ i/ (1 − τ ). Firms could raise firm value by
substituting expensive equity by cheap debt. However, more debt adds agency costs of
d (m B) /d B = m + bm ′. The optimal debt asset ratio is found when the tax preference
is offset by the extra agency costs. In the absence of taxes, or with full financial
neutrality of taxes, the debt preference is eliminated, implying a natural debt asset ratio
b∗ on account of (7). Using (9) to replace bm ′ in (8), we find the user cost of capital
f ′ (K ) = b · [i + m] + (1 − b) · r − τμ
1 − τ . (11)
The firm equates the marginal product of capital to its user cost. In a steady state,
a fraction b of the capital stock is financed with debt and the remaining share 1 − b
with equity. The user cost weighs together the relevant tax adjusted costs of equity
and debt.9
9 For a similar result, see Fuest, Huber and Nielsen (2003). In their work, a fraction b of firms is debt
financed and a fraction 1 − b is equity financed. Here, financing shares reflect a representative firm.
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2.2.3 Non-corporate firms
With non-corporate firms, all profits are considered as part of the entrepreneur’s income
which is subject to the income tax once. Under current tax law, the tax rate τ must
be interpreted as the entrepreneur’s income tax, without any further dividend tax,
t D = 0. However, when the firm is sold, she gets taxed on the capital gains equal
to the difference between the sales value and the book value of the firm’s assets at
a rate equal to her personal income tax rate τ . Due to the interest gains during the
holding period under the realization principle, the accruals equivalent rate is lower,
tG < τ . The ADIT system instead taxes profits at the company level by the general
profit (corporate) tax at rate τ and again at the personal level at the uniform rate
t S such that the cumulative tax burden of (supernormal) profits is equal to the top
wage tax rate.10 All profits are taxed on a current basis as part of private income,
regardless of whether they are retained or distributed. Investment is thus financed by
new equity and debt. Hence, V N = I − N and D = π in (2). Inserting into the no-
arbitrage condition (1), one obtains r V = 1−t D1−tG π + N − I +
·V with r = 1−t B1−tG i . The
Hamiltonian is H = 1−t D1−tG π + N − I + q I + λN . After a number of now familiar
steps, the solution emerges as
∇ ≡
1−tG
1−t D r−τμ
1−τ − i = m + bm ′, r = 1−t
B
1−tG i, (12)
f ′ (K ) = b · [i + m] + (1 − b) ·
1−tG
1−t D r − τμ
1 − τ . (13)
2.2.4 Neutrality of ADIT
The shareholder tax as part of ADIT is levied at a uniform, flat rate t S on all types
of capital income at the personal level, t D = tG . Since ADIT includes a surcharge to
compensate for the interest gains from tax deferral under the realization principle, it
equates the dividend tax rate with the accruals equivalent capital gains tax rate. The
tax rate on equity as listed in (5) thus becomes independent of the dividend payout
ratio θ . In other words, ADIT is neutral with respect to the dividend payout policy of
firms and treats retained earnings and new equity on an equal footing.
In addition, ADIT also equates the tax rates on interest and equity income, t E = t B ,
and therefore treats equity and debt fully neutral at the personal level. Consequently,
the cost of equity becomes equal to the market rate of interest, r = i , as is evident
from (5). To achieve neutrality, the equal treatment of equity and debt must also be
extended to the company level which is achieved by allowing tax deductibility of the
imputed cost of equity. Setting the cost of equity equal to the market rate of interest
(on safe bonds) on account of the uniform shareholder tax, the appropriate allowance
is equal to the interest rate, μ = r = i , which is fixed by the residence principle of
10 Technically, the status quo is represented by τ equal to the personal income tax rate and t D = 0 while
the (accruals equivalent) rate tG > 0 is levied on the capital gains realized by a change in ownership. Under
SDIT, τ is reduced to the general profits tax while both distributed profits and capital gains arising from
retained profits get uniformly taxed at the uniform (accruals equivalent) rate t D = tG = t S .
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interest taxation to the world interest rate. Substituting into (10) shows that ADIT
entirely eliminates the distortion in the debt asset ratio, ∇ = 0. Firms will accordingly
choose the natural leverage b∗ as in the absence of taxation which minimizes total
agency costs bm(b).
The most important advantage of ADIT is its investment neutrality. Since the ACE
system allows for a tax deduction of all costs of finance, including both debt and an
imputed cost of equity, it entirely eliminates the investment tax wedge. With μ = r ,
the profit tax disappears from the user cost of capital in (11), f ′(K ) = b∗ · [i + m] +
(1 − b∗) · r . Noting r = i by uniform taxation at the personal level, and m(b∗) = 0 on
account of neutrality towards financial decisions, ADIT is seen to be fully neutral with
respect to investment. The user cost of capital is equal to the world rate of interest,
f ′(K ) = i .
The ADIT tax system is also neutral with respect to financing and investment of
non-corporate firms since these firms are treated exactly the same as corporations. The
entrepreneur’s income tax τ is now set equal to the general profits tax while returns
in terms of distributed profits and realized capital gains are taxed at the uniform
(accruals equivalent) rate of the shareholder tax, t D = tG = t S , which also applies to
interest income, t B = t S . Therefore, (12) implies r = i and ∇ ≡ r−τμ1−τ − i . Noting the
allowance for the cost of equity at a rate μ = r shows that ADIT is neutral with respect
to the entrepreneur’s debt equity choice, ∇ = 0. The same substitutions in (13) yield
f ′(K ) = i if the agency cost is zero at the optimally chosen debt asset ratio. ADIT
is thus neutral with respect to investment and, by implication, also with respect to
the allocation of capital between the non-corporate and domestic corporate sectors,
f ′(K NC ) = i = f ′(K DC ).
2.2.5 Moving from the status quo to ADIT
With this stylized model, we can already indicate some key adjustments following an
implementation of the ADIT reform. First, the reform completely removes an initial tax
bias t D > tG against corporate distributions. The dividend payout ratio will increase
significantly. Current taxation implies a preference for debt, corresponding to ∇ > 0
in (10), which is the net result of equity being favored on the personal level and debt
being favored on the company level. Removing the tax distortion should reduce the
debt asset ratio slightly. Moving to ADIT will tend to strengthen the equity base of
companies.
Interest on debt is taxed more heavily at the personal level than the average return
to equity. Since all assets must yield the same net return, the personal tax prefer-
ence for equity implies a cost of equity smaller than the cost of debt, r < i , see
(5). The introduction of ACE removes the tax wedge on investment at the com-
pany level which reduces the user cost of capital. The second effect is much more
important. ADIT substantially reduces the user costs of capital and thereby promotes
investment.11
11 By the envelope theorem, the effect of the tax reform on the optimally chosen debt asset ratio does not in-
fluence investment. The differential of (11) yields f ′′d K = [i + m + bm′ − r−τμ1−τ ] · db + (1 − b) · d r−τμ1−τ .
The square bracket disappears when the debt asset ratio is optimally chosen as in (10). The formula also
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3 Quantitative assessment
3.1 The simulation model
Assessing the quantitative effects of a far reaching tax reform obviously requires a
general equilibrium model of the economy. The stylized analysis of the preceding sub-
section reflects only the bare bones of the rich economic structure of our computational
model. We briefly state the most important additional model features.12
3.1.1 Savings
Household decisions are based on an overlapping generations model in the tradition of
Blanchard (1985). The level of savings follows from the intertemporal consumption
choice of individual households. The model is extended to endogenous labor supply
and portfolio composition of savings. Household sector decisions follow, after aggre-
gation, from the maximization of life-time utility ( ¯Ut )μ =
∑∞
s=t (βρ)s−t [Cs − ϕ(ls)]μ
subject to a budget constraint13
G	 ¯At+1 =
(
1 + ı¯ nt
)
¯At + T Ht + (1 − t L )wt lt − (1 + t I )Ct . (14)
Our assumption that within period preferences C − ϕ (l) are additively separable
excludes intertemporal substitution in labor supply and eliminates income effects.
Consequently, labor supply exclusively depends on the current real wage,
ϕ′ (lt ) = 1 − t
L
1 + t I wt . (15)
3.1.2 Portfolio composition
The long-run level of accumulated savings ¯A is mainly driven by the average net of
tax portfolio return ı¯ n and disposable labor income. The simulation model realistically
allows for small return differentials among imperfectly substitutable assets, reflecting
in part the well documented home bias in international portfolio diversification, see
French and Poterba (1991) and Gordon and Bovenberg (1996). Savings can be invested
in domestic and foreign government debt and business bonds, equity of domestic
corporate and noncorporate firms, and in shares of domestic and foreign multinational
shows that allowing for debt finance is very important for quantitative analysis since the impact of profit
taxation is scaled down by the size of the debt asset ratio: f ′′d K = (1 − b) · d r−τμ1−τ .
12 A complete documentation of the model (Keuschnigg, 2004b) is available upon request.
13 The notation refers to σC = 1/(1 − μ) intertemporal elasticity of substitution, C consumption, l labor
supply, ρ subjective discount factor, β survival probability, and ϕ (l) convex increasing effort cost. The
model includes exogenous productivity and inflation trends but is presented in detrended form where G is
one plus the rate of productivity growth and 	 is one plus the inflation rate. In the budget, ¯A is accumulated
savings, ı¯ n net of tax portfolio return, w wage rate, T H lump-sum transfers, t L and t I are the rates of wage
and indirect taxes.
Springer
Growth oriented dual income tax 203
firms. The simulation model, however, does not allow for owner-occupied housing and
tax favored institutional investors such as pension funds. It thus cannot capture the
potential efficiency gains of a more neutral allocation of savings and investment when
the personal tax rate on non-favored financial assets is reduced.14 The composition of
savings follows from portfolio choice using preferences A[(1 + i n,i )Ai , i = 1, . . . , I ]
over end of period wealth, similar to Sørensen (2001). The maximization is subject to
the budget ¯A = ∑i Ai . Preferences are of the linear homogeneous CES type with an
asset substitution elasticity σ A. The solution yields asset demand functions that are
proportional to overall portfolio wealth and increase in the net of tax return of asset Ai
relative to a “rate of return index”. The average portfolio return ı¯ n for intertemporal
decisions follows from
(1 + ı¯ n) ¯A =
∑
i
(1 + i n,i )Ai . (16)
Domestic savings flow into home and foreign assets and foreign investors de-
mand home issued assets which leads to international cross ownership of assets.15
Invoking the ‘small’ open economy assumption, foreign rates of return and the over-
all level of foreign savings are exogenous to Swiss investors. Domestic rates of re-
turn must adjust to clear the relevant asset markets. For example, domestic business
debt is issued by domestic corporate and non-corporate firms as well as the domes-
tic subsidiaries of home and foreign based multinationals. The interest rate i B must
adjust to equate the supply of business debt with demand by home and foreign in-
vestors. The market clearing interest on domestically issued public debt is i G . Equity
of domestically owned corporate and non-corporate firms is non-traded and simi-
larly yields a market clearing rate of return. Finally, equity of multinational firms
is traded on international stock markets where a perfectly elastic foreign demand
fixes the gross rate of return. In this case, domestic personal taxes cannot influence
the gross return. An increase in domestic dividend and capital gains taxes will only
reduce the net returns and thereby depress domestic demand for these shares, see
Devereux (2000).
3.1.3 Multinational investment
In- and out-going FDI stems from home and foreign based multinationals.16 These
firms are listed on international stock markets where the marginal investor is most likely
14 Swiss taxpayers must add imputed rent on owner occupied housing to taxable income but can also deduct
interest on mortgages. The tax distortion is probably smaller than in other countries.
15 See Devereux (2004), Huizinga and Nielsen (1997), Keen and Ligthart (2006) and Slemrod, Hansen and
Procter (1997), among others.
16 A home based multinational faces an exogenous gross return on equity rm and maximizes total value
rm V Ht = DH Ht + DH Ft + G	V Ht+1 − V Ht . Given rm , we calculate net of tax returns for its domestic in-
vestors. The firm generates dividends from domestic and foreign subsidiaries, DH H = π H + B N H −
(I H − δK H ), where B N H is new debt issued at home and π H is domestic profits net of corporate tax.
DH F is similarly defined. The foreign subsidiary’s net profit is π H F = Y H F − pQ H Q H − wF L H F −
(m H F + i B F )B H F − δK H F − τ H F π˜ H F . The term pQ H Q H is the cost of services and goods supplied by
the domestic parent company, evaluated at a transfer price pQ H , creating net revenues (pQ H − 1 − cH )Q H
for the parent company. The tax manipulation cost cH progressively rises when the transfer price deviates
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Table 1 Parameter values
Parameter Value Parameter Value
Interest rate i = 4% Labor supply elasticity ∗ L = .2
Inflation rate π = 1% Intertemporal substit. elast.∗∗ σC = .5
Technology growth g = 1.8% Elasticity of capital demand∗∗∗ K = 1
Capital depreciation δ = 10% Blanchard survival probability β = .95
Note: ∗See Blundell and MaCurdy (1999). ∗∗See Kydland and Prescott (1982)
and Hansen and Singleton (1983). ∗∗∗See Fuchs, Krueger and Poterba (1998) and
Hassett and Hubbard (2002).
a foreign or tax exempt institutional investor not subject to domestic personal taxes.
Therefore, the return to equity of multinational firms is fixed internationally while
personal taxes can affect the cost of equity of domestically owned firms. This different
response to domestic personal taxes is mostly overlooked in existing quantitative
studies. On the other hand, a reduction in corporate taxes stimulates investment by
all firms and, in particular, multinational investment. In addition, our model allows
for profit shifting through transfer pricing. It includes a fixed factor for each sector,
thereby giving rise to limited rents and supernormal profits that continue to be taxed
with the profit tax despite of the ACE deduction. Finally, all types of firms compete on
a common domestic labor market and pay the same wage. For this reason, tax policy
may lead to crowding out among firms.
3.1.4 Net foreign wealth
Given the investment and consumption choices of intertemporally optimizing agents
with perfect foresight, the home economy’s current account reflects the differential
trends in savings and investment at home and eventually results in an endogenously
adjusted net asset position.
3.1.5 Parameters
We start from long run averages of the required data series of the Swiss economy.
The model is then calibrated to replicate these averages as a stationary equilibrium. In
particular, we are careful to parameterize the important behavioral margins, including
financial decisions of firms. Table 1 shows the most important parameter values. In
calibrating debt equity choice, we follow Gordon and Lee (2001) who estimate that a
decrease in the corporate tax by 10% points reduces the debt asset ratio by three to four
percent. We model payout policy along the lines of Poterba and Summers (1985) and
more from the marginal cost of 1. The term τ H F π˜ H F is the total tax paid on foreign subsidiaries where π˜ H F
is the tax base and τ H F = τ F is the effective tax rate under the exemption method which is mostly applied
by Switzerland. The deduction or partial credit methods could also be supported. With optimal investment
allocation to home and foreign subsidiaries, pretax marginal products of capital must yield a common gross
return on equity after corporate taxes, (1 − τ e,H )Y HK = rm = (1 − τ e,H F )Y H FK , where τ e,H is the EMTR
on domestic investment and τ e,H F on outbound FDI. Foreign based multinationals are modeled symmetri-
cally. The contribution of multinationals to domestic GDP thus stems from domestic subsidiaries of home
and foreign based subsidiaries as listed in Tables 5.
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Table 2 Tax rates in Switzerland: Status Quo vs. ADIT
Status Quo ADIT
Tax on DC NC DC NC
Profits tU 23.2% 37.3% 23.2% 23.2%
Allowance for equity μ no no yes yes
Capital gains tG 4.3% 15.3% 18.4% 18.4%
Dividends t D 37.3% – 18.4% 18.4%
Interest t B 37.3% 37.3% 18.4% 18.4%
Wages t L 37.3% 37.3% 37.3% 37.3%
Value added t I 7.6% 7.6% – –
Property tW 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7%
Note: DC: Domestic Corporations. NC: Noncorporate Firms. ADIT: Dual Income Tax
with Allowance for Cost of Equity.
Poterba (2004) who estimate the impact on the payout ratio of a change in the relative
tax treatment of dividends and capital gains. Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan
(2002) estimate the response of the equity premium to a (tax induced) change in the
payout ratio. We will provide a series of sensitivity tests to check the robustness of
results with respect to key behavioral parameters.
3.2 The current tax system
Table 2 reports the current structure of Swiss tax rates.17 In the status quo, wages,
interest payments, dividends, and profits of noncorporate firms are all subject to the
personal income tax at the same rate. Capital gains on movable private property in-
cluding shares in corporate firms are, in principle, tax exempt. An exception to this
rule are, for example, individuals classified as professional traders who must declare
realized capital gains as part of their taxable income. In contrast, capital gains realized
upon selling or transferring noncorporate firms are fully taxed. Since the profits of
noncorporate firms are taxed on a current basis and are independent of the payout
decision, capital gains taxes are less important for these firms.
Figure 1 shows effective marginal tax rates (EMTR) on investment by source of
finance, and separately for domestic corporate and non-corporate firms. EMTRs mea-
sure the size of the overall tax wedge between a firm’s pretax return and an investor’s
net of tax return in percent of the pretax return, taking account of all taxes at the firm
and personal level.
The Swiss tax system distorts on several important margins. Corporate taxation in
Switzerland follows the classical system where profits are first taxed at the corporate
level and, if distributed, are taxed again as dividends. This double taxation contrasts
with the effective tax exemption on capital gains. Since the return on internally financed
investments consists of lightly taxed capital gains, it bears a very low EMTR of 33.4%.
Alternatively, corporations may pay out profits and finance investment externally with
17 Cantons and municipalities of the Swiss federation autonomously choose tax rates on personal and
corporate income, resulting in pronounced tax differentials across regions. Focusing on the structure of the
tax system, we average the top tax rates on personal and corporate income and using cantonal GDP.
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Fig. 1 Effective marginal tax rates on investment: Status quo versus ADIT
new equity. Using this strategy, the return on investment financed with new equity
consists of dividends which are subject to double taxation. For this reason, the EMTR
on new equity is much higher, equal to 58.5%. The strong tax bias against dividends
and external risk capital has left its mark on the typical financial structure of Swiss
corporations. Most firms retain their earnings in order to save the dividend tax and
create lightly taxed capital gains. Many firms do not pay dividends at all.
In defining the macroeconomic impact of the dividend tax, our model adheres to the
old view of dividend taxation and assumes that the cost of equity financing is a weighted
average of the dividend and capital gains tax rates. The dividend payout ratio, taken to
be .4, serves as weight for the impact of the dividend tax. Using the tax rates of Table
2, the average tax on equity on the personal level is .4 × .373 + .6 × .043 = 17.5%
which determines, together with the wealth or property tax and the profit tax, the
EMTR on equity in Fig. 1. Under the new view of dividend taxation, firms finance
marginal investment with retained earnings so that the dividend tax becomes irrelevant
for capital accumulation, see Auerbach (2002). Recently, Chetty and Saez (2005)
emphasized the interaction of agency problems and dividend payments. They argue
that higher dividend taxes induce big firms to keep excessive amounts of capital. In
addition, new firms facing start-up costs and having to make an initial capital infusion
will have to raise new equity initially and thus anticipate future dividend taxes, see
Sinn (1991) and Dietz (2003). Both ideas imply that the dividend tax distorts capital
accumulation.
Looking at the three sources of finance separately, the Swiss tax system induces
the familiar hierarchy of finance or pecking order of financial sources. Comparing the
cost of debt with the weighted cost of equity indicates a moderate tax bias of about
two percentage points in favor of debt finance. However, this non-neutrality is the net
effect of two larger distortions on the company and personal level, see Miller (1977).
The personal tax rate on equity is an average of dividend and capital gains tax rates.
Since capital gains are largely untaxed in Switzerland, the weighted tax rate on equity
falls short of the interest tax. Interest on business debt is deductible from the corporate
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tax basis which strongly favors debt on the corporate level.18 Putting corporate and
personal taxes together results in a moderate preference for debt finance. For non-
corporate firms, profits are taxed only once so that there is no double taxation. As
before, interest on debt is subject to the interest tax. Since profit and interest taxes
coincide, see Table 2, there is no distortion between debt and equity.
The investment incentives by personal and corporate firms determine the sectoral
allocation of capital. Weighing together the EMTRs for debt and equity financed in-
vestments by the average ratio of debt to total capital, we obtain the EMTR of total
investment with mixed financing. Taking a debt asset ratio of roughly .28 for corpo-
rations, their total EMTR amounts to .72 × .437 + .28 × .408 = 42.9%. Comparing
this to the EMTR of 41.9% for noncorporate firms indicates that, on average, the Swiss
tax system is largely neutral with respect to organizational form. However, the average
numbers tend to mask a considerable heterogeneity across firm sizes. In reality, firms
tend to switch from personal to corporate status when they become bigger. These
firms must rely much more on external risk capital, i.e. new equity which bears a
much higher tax load under corporate form. Our average calculations may understate
the distortion of organizational choice.
The front row of Fig. 1 plots the EMTRs on investment that would result from im-
plementing the ADIT proposal. Quite obviously, the ADIT reform entirely eliminates
the tax distortions by source of finance or by choice of legal form. The small visible
differences stem from the different size of the equity premium (four percent) and the
intermediation margin on business debt (three percent). More importantly, the size of
the EMTRs is uniformly reduced due to the investment neutrality on the firm level.
The remaining tax wedge and size of EMTRs reflect moderate taxation at the personal
level, consisting of the wealth tax and the shareholder tax as part of ADIT. The sub-
stantial reduction of the EMTRs and of the user cost of capital is key to promoting
growth.
3.3 Long-run effects
Table 3 reports the long-run effects of a stepwise cumulative introduction of the ADIT
reform. The first lines document the tax parameters that identify the type of scenario.
Column “Base Case” refers to the initial steady state prior to reform. “Shareholder
Tax” means a dual income tax which eliminates distortionary taxation between divi-
dends and capital gains and treats personal and corporate sectors equally. “Reduced
Interest Tax” extends the shareholder tax to interest income. Column ADIT reports
the results of the complete scenario by additionally introducing the ACE allowance
for the opportunity cost of equity. In all three columns, the budget is balanced by ad-
justing the value added tax. The last column “ADIT w/ lump sum” finances instead by
lowering lump-sum transfers. We keep a constant GDP share of government spending
and a constant ratio of government debt to capital. This shifts the tax burden, to some
extent, to future generations which tend to gain the most from any growth enhancing
policy.
18 See MacKie-Mason (1990), Graham (1996) and Graham, Lemmon and Schallheim (1998) for empirical
evidence. Graham (2003) summarizes the empirical strategy and discusses further literature.
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Table 3 Long-run effects
Base Shareh. Reduced ADIT w/
Variable case tax Int. Tax ADIT lump sum
μ Allowance for equity no no no yes yes
tU Profit tax 23.22 23.22 23.22 23.22 23.22
t S Shareholder tax 37.32 18.36 18.36 18.36 18.36
t B Interest tax 37.32 37.32 18.36 18.36 18.36
t I Indirect tax 7.60 8.91 10.05 11.57 7.60
b Av. debt ratio 30.61 31.48 33.23 29.47 29.28
θ c Payout ratio, dom.corp. 40.00 55.00 55.00 55.00 55.00
uc User cost, dom.corp. 9.60 10.30 10.01 8.50 8.69
rc Cost of equity, dom.corp. 8.68 9.24 9.01 9.58 9.77
i B H Interest on bus. debt 9.83 9.74 8.75 7.96 8.17
ı¯ Av. portfolio return 5.26 5.42 5.73 5.79 5.90
w Market wages %) −0.67 0.47 3.72 3.21
wh Net wages %) −1.86 −1.76 0.03 3.21
Ls Employment %) −0.37 −0.36 0.01 0.63
K Aggregate capital %) −1.96 0.55 8.36 8.06
Y Gross dom.product %) −0.84 −0.14 2.43 2.74
Y ∗ Gross nat.product %) −0.41 2.53 4.77 4.33
C Priv. consumption %) −0.31 2.35 3.71 3.49
A Total assets/GDP 4.10 4.30 4.65 4.70 4.56
AF Net For. assets/GDP 0.65 0.70 0.98 0.95 0.86
Note: %) Percentage changes. Other values are absolute. Columns introduce ADIT step by
step. ‘Shareholder Tax’ sets t D = tG = t S for corporations and introduces the profit tax
combined with the shareholder tax t S for non-corporate firms. Next column reduces interest
tax to t B = t S . ADIT completes the reform by adding an Allowance for Corporate Equity.
The reform is financed with VAT, lump-sum only in the last column.
3.3.1 Shareholder tax
The first step extends the corporate tax to non-corporate firms and at the same time
replaces existing taxation of equity returns on the personal level by a flat uniform
tax at a reduced rate. For corporations, dividend and effective capital gains tax rates
are set equal to the rate of the shareholder tax satisfying (1 − tU )(1 − t S) = 1 − t L .
The negative effects mainly originate from the more effective taxation of capital gains
which is also a step towards a more equitable taxation. Up to now, capital gains
on shares are much tax favored. With θ = .4, Eq. (5) yields a weighted tax rate on
corporate equity of t E = .4 × .373 + .6 × .043 equal to 17.5% which now rises to
18.4%, the rate of the shareholder tax. Consequently, the savings tax wedge increases
and eventually results in a slightly higher overall EMTR and higher user costs of capital.
Non-corporate firms are not much affected. The shareholder tax scenario essentially
replaces the entrepreneurs’ income tax by separate profit and shareholder taxation with
an overall tax burden equal to the top personal income tax rate. In fact, this scenario
also eliminates a small surcharge to the income tax of about two percentage points
that stems from unfavorable treatment of entrepreneurs in the pension system which
should not be part of a system of capital income taxation. Investment incentives of
multinational firms are not directly affected by the shareholder tax. Since their gross
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Table 4 Portfolio structure
Ass. Base Case Shareh.Tax Int.Tax ADIT ADITL S
A j / ¯A in, j ˆA j in, j ˆA j in, j ˆA j in, j ˆA j in, j
¯A 100.00 5.26 3.89 5.42 13.32 5.73 17.43 5.79 14.34 5.90
AV C 17.58 2.46 8.75 3.09 13.12 2.90 21.75 3.37 19.03 3.53
AV N 22.42 2.46 3.41 2.58 7.13 2.34 9.48 2.28 7.01 2.43
Am H 8.27 2.46 10.26 3.24 16.83 3.24 20.16 3.24 15.70 3.24
Am F 2.00 2.46 8.61 3.08 15.08 3.08 18.36 3.08 13.97 3.08
AB H 7.54 2.46 1.70 2.40 19.15 3.44 15.13 2.80 12.74 2.97
AB F 20.52 2.46 2.24 2.46 22.90 3.76 26.40 3.76 21.72 3.76
AG H 12.70 2.46 −1.74 2.05 1.55 1.80 9.52 2.28 9.01 2.62
AG F 8.97 2.46 2.24 2.46 15.43 3.11 18.72 3.11 14.32 3.11
Note: Net returns in, j (net of taxes and net of equity premium) are absolute, i.e. i V C = r V C − tW
or i G H = (1 − t B )i G H − tW . Column Base Case reports asset shares in total portfolio wealth
¯A, the other columns give percentage changes of demand for types of assets. Asset demand is
for equity of domestic corporate and non-corporate firms (AV C and AV N ), equity of home and
foreign based multinationals (Am H and Am F ), home and foreign issued business debt (AB H and
AB F ), and home and foreign issued public debt (AG H and AG F ).
return on equity is internationally fixed, a change in personal taxes will only affect the
savings tax wedge and thus influence domestic demand for shares of multinationals.
Finally, the scenario loses considerable tax revenue on account of roughly halving the
dividend tax while the capital gains tax increase is narrowly based and thus cannot
make up for the losses. The value added tax must be raised accordingly which erodes
the real wage and discourages labor supply.
Clearly, the first scenario encourages savings, although selectively, since it favors
investments in equity over interest bearing assets and therefore triggers portfolio ad-
justments, see Table 4. The average net of tax portfolio return increases from 5.26
to 5.42% and induces a 3.9% increase in financial wealth.19 As the dividend tax cut
substantially raises corporate firm values, investors allocate a larger share of their sav-
ings to these assets. The value of equity holdings in domestically owned corporations
increases by 8.75% which induces a higher net return of 3.09% up from 2.46. Even
though the tax rate t E on corporate equity increases only to a minor extent, the in-
crease in the required net return to investors inflates the cost of equity listed in Table 3,
rising from 8.68 to 9.24%, and ultimately ends up in the user cost of capital rising
substantially to 10.3%. Now, the macroeconomic effects are straightforward. Higher
user costs of domestic corporations discourage investment, thereby reducing capital
intensity by d K/K − d L/L ≡ ˆK − ˆL = −1.96 + .37 = −1.6% and market wages
by −.67%. Since the value added tax must be raised by 1.3 percentage points, the net of
tax real wage declines considerably by −1.9%. Labor supply and employment shrink
by .4% which magnifies the negative effect on capital accumulation (−2%). GDP and
consumption must fall as well. Reflecting the net effect of a higher portfolio return
19 In Table 4, the average net of tax portfolio return ı¯ includes the exogenous “risk premia” on equity
and debt, equal to 4 and 3 percent. The net return in, j for each asset states the net, “certainty equivalent”
return without premium. These are equal to 2.46% across assets in the initial equilibrium while the average
portfolio return is higher, indicating that the premium also gives rise to extra asset income.
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and reduced net wages, the induced savings lead to a minor increase in net foreign
assets. The scenario also changes the financial behavior in the business sector. Since
the shareholder tax, including an accruals equivalent capital gains taxation, entirely
eliminates the tax bias against dividends, the payout ratio rises from 40% initially to
the ‘natural’ rate of 55% that is chosen in the absence of any tax distortion. On average,
firms prefer to rely more on new debt as a source of investment financing. The average
debt asset ratio increases by almost one percentage point. The reason is that the cost
of equity for domestic corporations increases while the market rate of interest slightly
declines.
3.3.2 Reduced interest tax
Next, we extend the shareholder tax rate of 18.36% to interest income which is
approximately half of the initial rate of 37.32%. The tax cut increases net returns
to interest bearing assets specifically and the average portfolio return in general.
This boosts savings and adds a 13.3% increase to household financial wealth, see
Table 4. The expansion of savings increases demand for all assets, but mostly flows
into interest bearing assets. Domestic and foreign issued business debt as well as
foreign government debt expand significantly more than the level of overall savings.
Since demand tends to increase in line with the growth of overall portfolio wealth,
the market rate of interest on public debt must fall to ration demand. The declining
domestic interest induces foreigners to shift away from this asset, leaving domestic
demand to increase by 1.55%. Halving the interest tax wedge allows for a higher net
return to savers (with the exception of public debt) and simultaneously a lower gross
interest rate to firms.
The strong increase in the volume of savings leads to lower rates of return on
all assets. Since households shift out of equity into interest bearing assets, domestic
interest rates fall much more than equity returns. The net effect is a minor reduction
of the gross return on equity to 9% and a large fall in the market rate of interest to
8.75% in Table 3. As equation (11) demonstrates, both effects strengthen investment
incentives of domestic firms, corporate and non-corporate. Multinationals benefit only
from the lower interest on the domestic cost of debt since the cost of equity is fixed on
international stock markets. Now, the economy’s average capital intensity increases
rather than declines as in the preceding scenario, and the market wage goes up by .47%.
Since the interest tax cut again loses revenue, indirect taxes have to be increased further
by more than one percentage point. The net of tax real wage therefore falls almost
as much as before and employment still declines by .36% compared to the base case
which again leads to a minor loss of GDP by −.14%. Aggregate consumption, however,
expands by a remarkable 2.35% which results from larger financial income out of a
higher level of savings that also earns a higher portfolio return. A considerable part of
the extra savings is invested internationally and thereby results in a net asset position
of almost hundred percent of GDP. The extra net foreign capital income substantially
adds to national income and leads to an increase in GNP, equal to GDP plus net foreign
capital income, of 2.5%.
The cut in the interest tax is needed for neutral treatment of debt and equity at
the personal level. Viewed in isolation, it induces more debt leverage. By (10) and
(5), a cut in the interest tax raises the net interest and, along with it, the opportunity
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cost of equity. As it makes debt more attractive on the personal level, the interest
tax cut raises the debt preference of firms. Consequently, the debt asset ratio must
increase, compared to the preceding scenario. The tendency for increased leverage is
reinforced by asset market adjustment which reduces gross interest on business debt
by a full percentage point while the cost of equity falls only by a relatively minor
extent.
3.3.3 ADIT
The effects of the complete scenario are reported in column “ADIT” . Viewed in iso-
lation, the last step introduces a tax allowance equal to the opportunity cost of equity.
In the simplest case of Eqs. (10) and (11), the imputed cost of equity is equal to the
market rate of interest on debt (μ = r = i) and must, in general, be endogenously
determined. As discussed in Section 2.2, the tax allowance eliminates the investment
tax wedge for all types of firms and extends the equal treatment of debt and equity
to the company level. In making both financing costs tax deductible, ADIT is fully
neutral with respect to debt equity choice. Compared to the preceding scenario, the
average debt asset ratio thus falls by roughly 4 percentage points to 29.47%, and
declines by more than 1 percentage point if compared to the status quo. The cost
of this initiative is that it reduces the profit tax liability to zero for firms that earn
no more than a normal rate of return and thereby again loses considerable tax rev-
enue which requires a further increase in indirect taxes. In long-run equilibrium, the
value added tax rate would have to increase by a 4 percentage points, up from 7.6 to
11.6%.
Introducing ACE substantially cuts the average tax burden and raises firm values
by 22% for domestic corporations and 9.5% for non-corporate firms. To induce the
required portfolio reallocation, investors must be offered a higher net return on do-
mestic corporate equity, see Table 4, which, in turn, raises the cost of equity. The
elimination of the investment tax wedge allows at the same time a remarkable decline
in the user cost, falling to 8.5% from the initial 9.6. User costs fall for all types of
firms, yielding an economy wide investment boom. In the long-run, the capital stock
is up by more than 8%. The higher capital intensity pushes up the market wage by
3.7% and eliminates the decline in the net real wage caused by the preceding steps.
The decline in labor supply is reversed and employment is roughly the same as under
the status quo. Since the labor force no longer shrinks, capital accumulation is much
more effective in raising GDP. Reflecting the savings response and the increased net
foreign asset position, GNP increases substantially by 4.8%.
Table 5 shows the differential impact of the full tax reform on domestic and multina-
tional firms. The first line documents the sectoral employment shares in the domestic
labor force. Switzerland is home to quite a number of world renowned multinational
firms employing a remarkable 22% of the labor force. Domestic corporations and non-
corporate firms employ 48% and 30% of total labor, respectively. The table reveals
that the aggregate results of Table 3 mask a considerable heterogeneity in the response
of the business sector. For variables that are stated in absolute values, the upper left
number is the rate in the status quo and the lower right number reports the same figure
after the ADIT reform. The numbers for user cost of capital and cost of equity are
found again in Table 3 for domestic corporations.
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Table 5 Results by sector
DC NC Mh Mfh
SQ ADIT SQ ADIT SQ ADIT SQ ADIT
Labor share 48.00 30.00 15.70 6.30
EMTR Total 43.71 47.84 51.77 46.96
28.66 30.07 29.41 25.28
EMTR Saving 28.93 17.63 39.12 33.05
28.66 30.07 29.41 25.28
EMTR Investment 20.79 36.68 20.78 20.78
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Debt ratio 28.04 39.86 29.06 29.06
28.39 35.98 26.97 26.97
User cost of capital 9.60 10.36 10.00 10.00
8.50 7.48 7.92 7.92
Cost of equity 8.68 7.63 9.00 9.00
9.58 8.55 9.00 9.00
Labor demand % −3.85 −2.65 12.06 12.01
Capital stock % 2.51 7.20 22.46 22.40
Produktion % −1.53 −0.29 14.77 14.71
Note: %) Percentage changes. Other values are absolute. DC: Domestic Corporations. NC: Noncor-
porate Firms. Mh: Multinationals at home. Mfh: Foreign Multinationals. SQ: Status Quo. ADIT:
Dual Income Tax with Allowance for Equity.
The cost of equity for multinationals are determined on international stock mar-
kets and thus remain constant. The cost of equity for domestic firms increases quite
significantly. The reduced personal taxation of foreign source interest income results
in higher net of tax returns on foreign assets whereas pretax returns are interna-
tionally fixed. With multinational firms, the dividend tax cut weighs more heavily
than the capital gains tax increase since the dividend payout ratio of the very large
multinational firms tends to be higher than with domestic firms. Consequently, the
tax reform reduces the effective personal tax t E = θ t D + (1 − θ )tG on returns to
multinational shares and thereby boosts the net return quite significantly as Table 5
verifies by the reduction in the EMTR on savings.20 With a high degree of asset
substitutability, the net return on domestic equity must increase when net returns on
other assets rise. Without any compensating reduction of the tax rate t E for home
corporations (which slightly increases, in fact), the cost of equity is pushed up as
well. For this reason, the investment stimulus is concentrated more with multina-
tional rather than domestic firms. Since all firms compete in the same labor market,
multinational firms end up crowding out employment by domestic firms quite con-
siderably. Weighing together the sectoral percentage changes in employment with the
sectoral employment shares yields the macroeconomic employment effect in Table 3:
−3.85 × .48 − 2.65 × .3 + 12.06 × .157 + 12.01 × .063 = +.01%.
20 If u = YK − δ is the user cost, re the gross return on equity and rn = in,V + p is the net of tax return
including the equity premium (note that Table 4 reports the net return exclusive of the premium), the EMTR
on investment is given by τ e,i = (u − re)/u and the EMTR on savings by τ e,s = (re − rn)/re , see Table 5.
The overall tax wedge thus amounts to rn = (1 − τ e,s )(1 − τ e,i )u.
Springer
Growth oriented dual income tax 213
3.3.4 ADIT w/ lump sum
The last scenario recomputes the effects of the complete ADIT proposal, but adjusts
lump-sum taxes on households instead of the value added tax to make up for the lost tax
revenue. This yields two main consequences. First, it avoids the extra distortion against
labor supply since the marginal tax on labor income remains unchanged. Gross and net
real wages thus increase by the same percentage, i.e. 3.21%. This stimulates additional
labor supply which expands employment by .63% in the long-run and facilitates the
macroeconomic expansion.
Second, a higher lump-sum tax on labor and a higher VAT both reduce real value
of disposable wage income. A higher VAT, however, also erodes the real value of
pre-existing wealth and thereby induces more savings than the lump-sum tax. With
aggregate savings lower in the lump-sum scenario, the net portfolio return must in-
crease by more in order to elicit the necessary savings. Since foreign rates of interest
are fixed and capital income tax rates remain unchanged, higher net returns translate
into higher market rates of interest on domestic business debt and a higher cost of
equity. The user costs of capital rise and thereby retard investment to a moderate ex-
tent. Despite of the extra employment, the capital stock grows by a somewhat smaller
amount compared to the main ADIT scenario. The capital intensity thus falls relative
to ADIT, explaining the smaller increase in the gross wage. Despite of a slightly re-
duced capital stock, the extra employment results in an even more vigorous expansion
of GDP. Aggregate consumption swells by 3.5% relative to the status quo. Finally,
the smaller savings response also translates into a more moderate increase in the net
foreign asset position and a somewhat smaller increase in GNP of 4.3%.
3.4 Transitional effects
The ADIT proposal shifts the tax burden from capital to labor income. The growth
effects from eliminating the tax wedge on investment and reducing it on savings yield
substantial long-run gains while the increase in the value added tax (VAT) needed to
make up for the revenue losses dominates the short-run picture. Instantaneous budget
balancing would dictate an immediate increase in the VAT rate to 16.5% which is
more than double the initial value of 7.6%. Figure 2 plots the time path of the required
VAT rates. Higher indirect taxes erode the real wage and rather immediately impair
employment. Since capital is predetermined in the short-run, the unfavorable employ-
ment response leads first to a moderate contraction of GDP before the investment led
expansion takes hold. As Fig. 3 illustrates, GDP instantaneously falls by .9% in the
first period before it starts to grow at rapid rates. The gains from capital accumulation
thus arrive with a significant delay of several years. Typically, empirical studies find
that it takes about eight years to achieve half of the long-run effects. As the induced
capital accumulation proceeds, the short-run loss is turned into a GDP gain after about
five years and eventually results in an increase of 2.43% as reported in Table 3. GDP
growth swells the tax bases and generates extra revenue so that an ever lower VAT rate
suffices to assure periodic budget balance. The long-run VAT rate is 11.6% which is
5 percentage points lower than the short-run value reported in Fig. 2. Together with
Springer
214 C. Keuschnigg, M.D. Dietz
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0 20 40 60 80 100
ADIT (periodic budget balance)
Status Quo
ADIT (tax smoothing)
Fig. 2 Value added tax: Periodic budget balancing versus tax smoothing
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
percent
ADIT (VAT smoothed)
ADIT (VAT periodic)
Status quo
ADIT (lump-sum, periodic)
Fig. 3 GDP under alternative budget financing strategies
the increase in gross wages, the lower VAT rates essentially eliminate the short-run
employment losses.
The distributional implications of this adjustment pattern are obvious and largely
apply to any growth oriented tax reform.21 The gains to labor in terms of employment
prospects and higher wages arrive only with a delay while the gains to capital are felt
immediately. Tax capitalization and the higher returns to capital in the transitional
21 Keuschnigg (1994) discusses intergenerational redistribution effects resulting from these adjustments.
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period lead to instantaneous increases in asset prices and windfall profits benefiting
the owners of old capital in place. With ADIT, these capital gains get effectively taxed
once they are realized, with a surcharge on the interest gains from tax deferral until
realization. It must be emphasized that these windfall gains are not to be avoided
because they are a reflection of the investment incentives needed to promote growth.
Nonetheless, the unfavorable short-run GDP and employment losses of the tax reform
naturally call for some strategy to smooth the gains and costs intertemporally and
across generations.
An alternative to periodic budget balance is to balance the budget intertemporally,
allowing deficits early on and running surpluses in the future such that a constant value
added tax rate is sustained. This scenario thus accumulates substantial government debt
and is called “tax smoothing” . The tax rate must be endogenously computed and turns
out to be 14.4% which is lower than the short-run but higher than the long-run rate
under periodic budget balancing, see Fig. 2. Reflecting the implications of the VAT
for labor supply, the tax smoothing scenario dampens the short-run employment and
GDP losses. As Fig. 3 shows, GDP falls by only .7%, instead of .9% under periodic
budget balancing. The mirror image of the short-run effects is that tax smoothing also
dampens the long-run gains since the VAT rate must be higher to serve the public debt
accumulated in the early adjustment period. GDP grows by only 2.25% instead of
2.43%. Reflecting the rather inelastic labor supply response, smoothing the VAT rate
is not very effective in smoothing GDP adjustment.
To isolate the extra distortion introduced by the higher VAT, we run an alternative
scenario of cutting lump-sum transfers. This reduces disposable income and the scope
for savings but also avoids the labor supply distortion of the VAT. In reality, a reduction
in social transfers might even have favorable effects on labor market participation since
it widens the income differential between work versus non-work and thereby sharpens
incentives for job search. Our model neither captures these work incentives nor is it
able to appropriately take account of the unfavorable redistribution within generations.
Our framework thus implies that lump-sum transfer cuts avoid the short-run reduction
in employment and GDP. Furthermore, the gross wage gains resulting from capital
accumulation boost labor supply which magnifies the investment induced expansion
of GDP, although not by a very large amount. Figure 3 illustrates.
3.5 Sensitivity analysis
While important qualitative insights can be derived from theory, the magnitudes are
always sensitive and depend on key elasticities that determine the behavioral responses
of individuals and firms. Quite often, parameters are estimated rather imprecisely in the
econometric literature, leaving a substantial range of equally credible values. Table 6
summarizes the results of sensitivity analysis. Column “ADIT” reproduces the results
of the main scenario in Table 3. We first consider the elasticity of capital demand with
respect to the user cost of capital which is equal to 1 in the main case. A lower value
of K = 0.75 naturally reduces the impact of a tax reform that reduces the cost of
capital. The capital stock increases only by 6.3% instead of 8.4% in the base case, and
the gains of the tax reform in terms of long-run GNP and consumption are somewhat
smaller.
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Table 6 Sensitivity analysis
Variable ADIT K L σC μ srep
K Elast. capital demand 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
L Elast. labor supply 0.20 0.20 0.50 0.20 0.20 0.20
σC Intertemp. subst. elast. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.65 0.50 0.50
μ Asset subst. elasticity 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 5.00 10.00
srep Reported share 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.50
uc User cost, dom.corp. 8.50 8.50 8.52 8.35 8.65 8.58
i B H Interest on bus. debt 7.96 7.85 7.98 7.78 7.82 8.06
ı¯ Av. portfolio return 5.79 5.77 5.80 5.70 5.72 5.69
t I Rate of indirect tax 11.57 11.50 11.70 10.75 11.51 11.65
w Market Wages %) 3.72 3.75 3.68 4.03 3.65 3.53
wh Net Wages %) 0.03 0.12 −0.13 1.07 0.02 −0.23
Ls Employment %) 0.01 0.02 −0.06 0.21 0.00 −0.05
K Aggregate Capital %) 8.36 6.33 8.18 9.38 8.22 7.85
Y Gross dom.prod. %) 2.43 1.86 2.34 2.85 2.38 2.26
Y ∗ Gross nat.prod. %) 4.77 4.36 4.58 5.86 4.03 3.47
C Priv. Consumption %) 3.71 3.58 3.53 4.74 3.00 2.36
A Total Assets %) 17.43 16.83 16.90 21.04 15.33 13.63
Y C Output Corporate Sec. %) −1.53 −0.92 −1.77 −0.07 −2.62 −2.29
Y N Output Noncorp. Sec. %) −0.29 −0.22 −0.31 −0.28 0.18 −0.28
Y h Output home multis %) 14.77 10.71 14.90 13.43 16.31 15.63
Y f h Output foreign multis %) 14.71 10.67 14.84 13.41 16.23 15.56
Note: %) Percentage changes. Other values are absolute. Residual budget financing with VAT. K
elasticity of capital demand, L elasticity of labor supply, σC intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
μ elasticity of portfolio substitution, srep share of foreign asset income reported.
The next column recomputes the main ADIT scenario with a higher elasticity of
labor supply, using a value of .5 instead of .2. The long-run results are not much
different. The reason is that the ADIT reform results only in a negligible variation of
the net wage of .03% which cannot give rise to a larger labor supply effect, irrespective
of the magnitude of the elasticity. However, a higher wage elasticity of labor supply
would magnify the short-run decline in GDP reported in Fig. 3 which mainly results
from the reduction in labor supply in response to the initial increase in the value
added tax. The reform would be more costly in the short-run in this case. A higher
wage elasticity would also importantly magnify the long-run gains of the lump-sum
financing scenario in Table 3 which stimulates labor supply on account of higher
wages.
Given that ADIT substantially strengthens savings incentives, the intertemporal
substitution elasticity becomes a prime candidate for a sensitivity check. The empirical
estimates support both higher and lower values than our base case value of .5. A higher
value of σC = .65 strongly magnifies the long-run effects of the reform. When the
savings response is more elastic, a smaller increase in the average portfolio return
already suffices to elicit the required asset accumulation. Consequently, the ADIT
scenario leads to smaller interest rates and returns to equity for domestically issued
assets which leads to smaller user costs, larger investment, higher wages and larger
employment. Aggregate private consumption increases by 4.7%. Note further that only
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domestically owned firms will benefit from the lower cost of equity. Consequently,
this scenario reduces the crowding out effects on the labor market and shifts the
macroeconomic expansion away from the multinational towards the domestic sector.
Obviously, a lower elasticity generates the opposite effects and much reduces the gains
of tax reform.
Next, we cut the elasticity of portfolio substitution μ in half, making asset demand
less sensitive to return differentials. Households shift less to foreign assets if the
return at home declines and domestic interest rates can fluctuate to a larger extent in
response to a given shock. However, domestic investors are also less willing to shift
their portfolio demand towards equity of home firms where the tax cuts raise firm
values the most. The return to domestic equity rises considerably in order to induce
the required change in portfolio composition. Cheaper debt encourages investment,
especially by multinationals, while a higher cost of equity, only for domestic firms,
retards investment. As Table 6 shows, multinationals expand even more while domestic
corporate firms get crowded out to an extent that results in a smaller increase of
the macroeconomic capital stock. Except for the decline of private consumption, the
macroeconomic impact is rather limited though.
The last exercises address the effectiveness of the residence principle in interna-
tional capital income taxation. In the base case, we assume that only 80% of foreign
source asset income are reported at home. Underreporting relates to interest on bonds,
dividends and capital gains on multinational shares and the wealth tax on foreign in-
vested assets.22 The last column reports the results when only 50% of foreign source
asset income is reported. Consequently, the tax cut as part of the ADIT scenario ap-
plies only to a smaller fraction of asset income, and the average net of tax portfolio
return increases to a smaller degree (i.e. by 6.69 instead of 5.79%). Savings is reduced
which pushes up domestic interest rates and equity returns, raises the cost of capital
and therefore reduces the expansionary effects. The VAT rate must be raised even
more to finance the public budget. However, one expects that lower domestic taxes
will induce investors to report a larger share of foreign source asset income. In a sep-
arate calculation not shown in Table 6, we have thus assumed that the share of foreign
source income reported at home increases from 50 to 70% as part of the scenario. This
behavioral response, however, raises the effective tax rate for any given statutory rate
as a larger share of asset income becomes subject to the tax. The net of tax portfolio
return and therefore savings are reduced. Domestic interest rates must rise and the
investment driven expansion is further reduced. The only difference is that the extra
revenue from increased reporting allows for a smaller VAT rate which stimulates labor
supply to a minor extent but doesn’t much change the macroeconomic impact.
4 Conclusions
This paper has laid out a proposal for fundamental capital income tax reform that elim-
inates much of the investment and savings distortion. The reform combines a specific
version of the Nordic dual income tax with an allowance for corporate equity (ACE
22 The degree of underreporting is uncertain. The Swiss tax administration considers this a realistic number
as professional and institutional investors who keep book records find it difficult to underreport.
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system). The proposed system eliminates the investment tax wedge at the company
level since all costs of finance for both debt and equity are tax deductible from the
profits tax. A normal rate of return is tax exempt but the profits tax continues to tax an
excess return to capital such as monopolistic profits or rents. The proposed system not
only eliminates the marginal effective tax rate on investment, but also substantially
reduces the average tax burden. Firms that earn no more than a normal return on cap-
ital, do not pay any profit taxes at all. Since the average tax rate is more important for
the location decision of multinational firms, the reform is a decisive step to increase
the attractiveness of Switzerland as a location of multinational investment.
At the personal level, a comprehensive, flat tax on all forms of capital income
at a moderate rate is suggested. The rate is chosen to avoid misdeclaration of en-
trepreneurial wage income as low taxed capital income which is a common problem
of the dual income tax. The low tax rate roughly halves the existing rates on interest
and dividend income but also implies a more effective taxation of capital gains. It
introduces a powerful savings incentive. The system was shown to be neutral with re-
spect to investment, finance, and organizational choice and much reduces the savings
distortion. It was suggested that revenue losses are financed with a value added tax,
or a reduction in transfer spending.
A quantitative evaluation based on a detailed computational growth model of the
Swiss economy with domestically owned corporate and non-corporate firms and do-
mestic production of home and foreign based multinationals has shown substantial
long-run gains, amounting to a permanent increase of GNP between 4 and 5 percent.
However, the need to finance the revenue losses with an increase in the value added
tax imposes some short-run costs on account of an increased labor market distortion.
The detrimental labor market effect could be avoided to some extent if the reform
were financed by a cut in transfer expenditure. The dynamic simulations have also
reminded of the long time span needed until the larger part of the income gains become
effective.
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